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Relativizing Human Rights
TODD LANDMAN, DAVID KERNOHAN, AND ANITA GOHDES
Research, policy analysis, and conditional aid policy among some donor countries rely
on standards-based measures of country human rights performance. These measures
code annual performance based on narrative reports published by the US State Depart-
ment and Amnesty International. The coding yields a performance ranking for countries
that in our view is “absolute” or reflects that current state of human rights performance
without taking into account the relative social, political, or economic conditions within
countries. While this absolute ranking is useful for empirical analyses of some human
rights questions and policy applications, it can lead to perverse outcomes in other areas
of work. This article provides an alternative method for ranking country human rights
performance that takes into account an array of additional variables that are related to
the protection of civil and political rights. The method involves three stages. Stage one
applies principal component factor analysis to five different standards-based measures
of civil and political rights to extract a single human rights “factor score.” Stage two
regresses the factor score on a series of explanatory variables for the protection of civil
and political rights for which there is widespread consensus and then saves the residual
as an indicator of the “over” or “under” performance of countries with respect to the
protection of those rights. Stage three plots the “factor score” alongside the relative
score to compare these different measures of human rights performance over time and
across different regions. Our results lead to a new depiction of human rights progress in
the world that we believe will be of interest to human rights scholars and practitioners.
Introduction
For over 30 years, scholars and practitioners have been measuring human rights, where
considerable progress has been made on delineating which rights should be measured,
how they should be measured, and providing a variety of measures for different categories
and dimensions of human rights (see Jabine and Claude 1992; Landman 2002, 2005a,
2005b, 2006a, 2009a, 2009b; Landman and Larizza 2009; Landman and Carvalho 2009).
To date, measures have been developed that use events-based data, standards-based data,
and survey-based data, as well as socioeconomic and administrative statistics (see Jabine
and Claude 1992; Landman 2002; Landman and Carvalho 2009). The provision of human
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Relativizing Human Rights 461
rights data for global comparative analysis, however, has involved a narrow set of measures
for a narrow set of human rights, primarily the state violation of civil and political rights
(although some progress has been made in broadening the scope of rights).1 Typically, any
attempt to provide comparable measures of human rights has involved the development of
standards-based data that code annual human rights performance of countries from narrative
reports such as those provided by the US Department of State or Amnesty International.
These measures code countries against a well-defined set of human rights standards and
assign scores based on a limited scale that typically ranges from low (few violations and
good performance) to high (many violations and bad performance).2 These scales, such
as the political terror scale,3 Freedom House scale of civil liberties and political rights,4
Cingranelli and Richards human rights data5, and Oona Hathaway’s (2002) scale of torture,
are collected for a large number of countries (normally between 160 and 190) over many
years of time (between 15 and 40 years) and most suitable for empirical analyses that seek
to explain the variation in human rights protection or the relationship between human rights
protection and other variables of interest (see Landman 2005a, 2006a). There is now a large
and burgeoning subfield in political science, international relations, and socio-legal studies
that have employed these measures.
Despite the production and use of these scales, they all rest on a fundamental problem:
They code the annual human rights performance of a country without taking into account
other prevailing conditions within the country. At one level, this makes complete sense,
since human rights performance has been singled out, well defined, and then measured
in systematic ways (see Adcock and Collier 2001; Goertz 2006; Landman and Carvalho
2009). Such measures and the variation that they depict then become the object of inquiry
that is in need of explanation through the testing of empirical theories and models of
the kind developed in political science and related disciplines. But at another level, the
use of such measures for descriptive analysis and country ranking, as in Freedom House
reports “Freedom in the World,” can be highly problematic and prone to the kind of
criticism levelled at the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 1991 when it
published a report that compared human rights performance against the human development
index (see Barsh 1993). Such ranking is also popular among some donor agencies using
assessment frameworks for the allocation of overseas development assistance (ODA), such
as the Millennium Challenge Account in the United States and the World Bank’s Country
Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA). Here, country scores are used as litmus tests
for decisions on the initial allocation or further extension of foreign aid (Landman 2006b).
In both the academic and policy areas of work, simple reliance on country scores and
ranking paints a partial picture of human rights performance since the scores reflect only
an “absolute” ranking based on annual narrative reporting on human rights practices. In
response to this problem, this article advances an alternative measure of human rights that
takes into account significant factors that may have an effect on annual country performance.
It does so through three stages. First, it combines the main standards-based scales of civil
and political rights through factor analysis to create a single human rights factor score
(Landman and Larizza 2009) that provides a common dimension, or principal component,
of human rights performance across 160 countries for the period 1980 to 2004. Second,
it regresses this factor score on a series of key explanatory variables that feature in what
has become known as the “basic model” of human rights protection primarily in the
political science literature (see Landman 2005a, 2005b, 2006a) and then saves the residual
from the regression analysis as a measure of the unexplained variance in human rights
performance (see Duvall and Shamir 1980; Arat 1991, Foweraker and Landman 1997;
Cingranelli and Richards 2007). This unexplained variance, in our view, captures the human
rights performance of a country after having controlled for economic, political, and social
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462 Todd Landman et al.
conditions and thus represents a relativized measure of that performance. Third, it plots this
relativized performance across regions and time and against predicted or “expected” levels
of performance to show that despite the negative commentary on human rights conditions
around the world, some regions and countries are doing much better than expected given
the other prevailing socioeconomic and political conditions that exist. It also shows that
some regions are not doing as well as they should. In this way, the article offers a new way to
think about human rights country ranking that takes into account the relative performance
of human rights.
The article is structured in four main sections. The first section briefly outlines existing
standards-based measures of human rights, shows the bivariate relationships between them
and explains how the factor index has been generated. The second section reviews the
political science on the literature on the “basic model” of human rights protection to show
how we selected the key explanatory variables against which the factor score is regressed.
The third section plots the relativized human rights measure for the world over time and
for each major region by showing the difference between actual scores and predicted
scores given the presence of the key explanatory variables. The final section concludes
by considering the way forward and how this system can be used for relativizing other
categories of human rights.
Existing Scales of Human Rights Performance
The development of standards-based measures of human rights have moved from fairly
broad conceptions of the relative “freedom” in a country (www.freedomhouse.org) to more
narrowly defined sets of human rights that have in some cases included worker rights,
women’s economic rights, and women’s social rights (see www.humanrightsdata.com), as
well as measures of the de jure commitment of states to human rights through measuring
the treaty ratification behavior of states (Keith 1999; Landman 2005a). This present article
is primarily concerned with the measures that capture the variable protection in civil and
political rights using what are known as “standards-based” scales. These scales use source
material on human rights practices within countries and apply coding protocols to the
information to derive a set of standardized and comparable measures for cross-national and
time-series analysis.
Table 1 summarizes the five standards-based measures that we used to derive the human
rights factor score. These measures include the two versions of the Political Terror Scale
(one coded using US State Department Reports and one coded using Amnesty International
Reports), the scale of torture from Oona Hathaway (2002), Freedom House Civil Liberties,
and the Physical Integrity Rights Index from Cingranelli and Richards. Each of the scales
provides a measure of violations of civil and political rights, including such rights as freedom
from arbitrary detention, torture, extrajudicial killings, disappearances, exile, freedom of
speech, freedom of expression and belief, and freedom of assembly and association. With
the exception of the Cingranelli and Richards’ physical integrity rights index, the scales
award more points for a greater violation of these rights. For our purposes, all the scales were
transformed to range from low (bad rights protection) to high (good rights protection). The
table shows that despite the differences in emphasis across the scales, there is considerable
overlap between them, as evidenced by the statistically significant intercorrelations. The
correlations for the torture scale are the lowest across the board, which reflects the scale’s
more narrow focus on this form of human rights abuse, but the values within the table range
from .498 to .822 and are all at 99.9 percent levels of statistical significance.
This high degree of intercorrelation is not surprising, since the similarity in approach
to coding, measurement and focus suggests that these scales should be highly correlated
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Relativizing Human Rights 463
Table 1
Human Rights Scales Correlations
Variable
PTS
(AI)
PTS
(SD)
Torture
Scale
Freedom House
Civil Liberties
CIRI Physical
Integrity Index
PTS (AI) Pearson
Correlation
1 .820∗ .606∗ .512∗ .774∗
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000
n 3362 3322 1936 3296 3058
PTS (SD) Pearson
Correlation
.820∗ 1 .683∗ .589∗ .822∗
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000
n 3322 3647 2112 3576 3318
Torture Scale Pearson
Correlation
.606∗ .683∗ 1 .498∗ .685∗
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000
n 1936 2112 2198 2138 2059
Freedom House
Civil Liberties
Pearson
Correlation
.512∗ .589∗ .498∗ 1 .591∗
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000
n 3296 3576 2138 3751 3378
CIRI Physical
Integrity Index
Pearson
Correlation
.774∗ .822∗ .685∗ .591∗ 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000
n 3058 3318 2059 3378 3445
∗Correlation is significant at the .01 level (two-tailed).
with one another. Given this degree of agreement, we used principal components factor
analysis to reduce the group of interrelated human rights variables and collapse them
into one single measure. The analysis revealed five components, but only one has an
eigenvalue greater than 1 (i.e., 3.295) and accounts for over 65 percent of the variance. This
factor was retained and the other four were rejected for their absence of significance. The
resulting factor loadings for this component (see Table 2) clearly show a strong relationship
between each separate variable and the common underlying dimension they all measure.
Moreover, the component captures a set of human rights violations that are consistent
Table 2
Component Loadings
Extracted Component
PTS (AI) .845
PTS (SD) .909
Torture Scale .684
Freedom House Civil Liberties .720
CIRI Physical Integrity Index .877
Note. Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis
(PCA); Eigenvalue for extracted component = 3.295.
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464 Todd Landman et al.
with Cingranelli and Richards (1999: 410) findings about the unidimensionality of their
aggregate “personal integrity rights scale.” By definition, our human rights factor score is
normally distributed, with a mean of 0, a minimum value of −2.7 and a maximum value
of 1.97. The use of this component has several distinct advantages for the next stage in
the development of our alternative measure of human rights. First, it reduces the need for
tests of robustness that substitute various specifications across the five separate measures
that comprise the factor score. Second, it avoids using ordered logit or probit estimation
techniques required for standards-based measures that are less easy to interpret than more
standard regression estimators. Third, it allows for better substantive interpretation of our
final residual calculations discussed in the next section.
Modelling Human Rights Performance
The development of our alternative measure of human rights is predicated upon existing
research in the social and political sciences, which has led to a general consensus on the
“basic model” of human rights protection (see Landman 2005a). Since the first cross-
national statistical analysis on human rights in late 1980s (Mitchell and McCormick 1988),
there has been a proliferation of studies using increasingly large and complex data sets
and an expanding list of independent variables (see Landman 2005a; Moore 2006). These
variables most notably include the level, pace, and quality of economic development (e.g.,
Henderson 1991; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999), the level, timing, and
quality of democratization (e.g., Davenport 1999; Zanger 2000b; Davenport and Armstrong
2004; Bueno de Mesquita, Cherif, Downs, and Smith 2005), involvement in internal and
external conflict (Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999), the size and growth of the
population (Henderson 1993; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999), foreign direct
investment and/or the presence of multinationals (Meyer 1996, 1998, 1999a, 1999b; Smith,
Bolyard, and Ippolito 1999), the level of global interdependence (Landman 2005b), and the
growth and effectiveness of international human rights law (Keith 1999; Hathaway 2002;
Landman 2005b; Neumayer 2005; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005, 2007; Simmons 2009).
Our method regresses the human rights factor score on a selection of key explanatory
variables and then saves the residuals as a meaningful measure of human rights perfor-
mance. This method has been employed before in work on repression (Duvall and Shamir
1980), democracy and human rights (Arat 1991; Coppedge 2005; Larizza 2008), citizen-
ship rights and social movements (Foweraker and Landman 1997), and economic and social
rights (Cingranelli and Richards 2007). The idea is simple and straightforward. It rests on
the assumption that there has been a well-specified set of variables that account for the
variation in the dependent variable,6 which in our case is the human rights factor score.
This set of variables explains a large degree of that variation but not all of it, and thus the
unexplained variation becomes our variable of interest, since it is that variation in human
rights performance that cannot be explained by our selection of variables. Let us consider
this formally. The standard regression equation for a pooled cross-section time-series data
set is written as follows:
yit = α +
K∑
k=1
βkxkit + εit , (1)
where yit is the dependent variable for units i and time t (i.e., our human rights factor score for
each country and at each point in time) and the xkit variables are that collection of variables
that we specify as accounting for the variation in human rights performance that have
emerged through the last 30 years of cross-national research. The βk values are the regression
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 E
sse
x]
 at
 05
:16
 16
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
14
 
Relativizing Human Rights 465
coefficients that capture the relationship between each of the explanatory variables and
the human rights factor score (these estimations tell us the magnitude, direction, and
significance of the relationship). The α term is the intercept and the εit term is the error,
which in our case is the key variable of interest, since this is the residual or unexplained
variation in the human rights factor score. It is possible to illustrate this idea in simple
graphical terms to capture our idea of human rights “over” and “under” achievement in
the sections that follow. Imagine a simple bivariate relationship between our human rights
factor score y and one explanatory variable x (e.g., the level of economic development). We
know from previous research and our own analyses that economic development and human
rights are positively related, such that higher levels of economic development are associated
with a better protection of human rights. This relationship is presented in Figure 1.
The straight line comprises the “predicted” values of y given the values of x. Denoted
as ˆY in standard regression notation, the predicted values are the expected values of y for
each value of x. There are also actual values of y for each x that sit on the line, below the
line, or above the line. In our case, these are the actual values of our human rights factor
score. If the actual values sit on the line, there is no difference between the expected and
actual values of Y; if they sit above the line, then there is a positive difference between the
actual values and the expected values (Yit – ˆY > 0); and if they sit below the line then there
is a negative difference between the actual values and the expected values (Yjt – ˆY < 0). In
other words, for any given level of an explanatory variable (x1 – xn), some countries have
a human rights performance that is in line with expectations, better than expected (i.e., a
positive residual), or worse than expected (i.e., a negative residual), ceteris paribus. We
call countries with positive residuals “overachievers” since their human rights performance
is better than expected and countries with negative residuals “underachievers” since their
human rights performance is worse than expected. The use of the residuals thus captures
our understanding of relativizing human rights, since we are calculating the residual in the
presence of significant explanatory variables.
Ŷ [expected human rights protection]
Explanatory variables
(X1-Xn)
Low High
Low
High
Pr
ot
ec
ti
on
 o
f 
hu
m
an
 ri
gh
ts
Yit
Yjt
Yit-Ŷ  > 0 [human rights over achiever]
Yjt-Ŷ  < 0 [human rights under achiever]
FIGURE 1. Human rights overachievers and underachievers.
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466 Todd Landman et al.
Our selection of explanatory variables include income and land inequality, the level of
democracy, level of economic development, domestic conflict, population size, and ethnic
fractionalization (see Landman and Larizza 2009). This collection of variables represents
those that have received the most support or generated the most consensus within the
cross-national quantitative research on human rights (see Landman 2005a, 2006a, 2009b
for a summary). Each of these variables and the ways in which they are operationalized are
discussed in turn.
Inequality
For income inequality, we use a new measure based on the “inequality project” (UTIP)
developed by James K. Galbraith and Hyunsub Kum at the University of Texas, Austin.
In an effort to overcome the well-known deficiencies of the Deininger and Squire (1996)
data set on income inequality (i.e., sparse coverage, problematic measurements, and the
combination of diverse data types into a single data set), Galbraith and Kum use the
University of Texas Inequality Project-United Nations Industrial Development Organisation
(UTIP-UNIDO) measures of manufacturing pay inequality as an instrument to create a new
panel data set of Estimated Household income inequality (EHII), which covers a large
panel of countries from 1963 through 1999, for nearly 3200 country-years. This new
dataset provides comparable and consistent measurements across space and through time,
thus being a more valid proxy of income inequality than the Deininger and Squire data
usually employed by cross-national empirical studies (Galbraith and Kum 2004). For our
estimations, a linear interpolation of the original EHII variable has been computed for each
country-series to increase the number of observations.
For land inequality, we use a measure that is expressed as the area of family farms as
a percentage of the total area of land holdings (Vanhanen 1997). The reasoning behind this
measure is that the higher the percentage of family farms, the more widely economic power
resources based on ownership patterns of agricultural land are distributed (Vanhanen 1997:
47). Family farms are defined as “holdings that are mainly cultivated by the holder family
and that are owned by the cultivator family or held in ownerlike possession” (Vanhanen
1997: 49). The data on landownership were mainly derived from the FAO World Censuses
of Agriculture (from the 1960s to the 1980s) and Vananhen’s own estimations for the 1990s.
As with our income inequality data, these data have been interpolated to fill in missing
time points for those countries where two or more time points of data were made available.
To make this variable equivalent to income inequality in terms of its measurement of land
inequality, it has been inverted by subtracting the original percentage value from 100 such
that a low score means a more favorable distribution of land.
Other researchers have used different indicators to measure land inequality. The most
common alternative would have been the Gini index of land concentration (Russett et al.
1964; Muller and Seligson 1987). This type of index calculates “the difference between
an ‘ideal’ cumulative distribution of land (where all farms are the same size) and the
actual distribution” (Russett et al. 1964: 237–238). We prefer our measure to the Gini
index for three reasons. First, without controlling for the ownership of land, the Gini
index does not adequately capture the relative distribution of economic resources among
those who cultivate the land and is, thus, insensitive to the kind of asset inequality we
believe is most likely to be related to human rights abuses. Second, Brockett’s (1992: 172)
empirical analysis clearly demonstrates that land distribution data based on the Gini index
tend to underestimate land maldistribution in countries characterized by the prevalence of
landlessness among peasants. Third, the necessary data on the number and size of land
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Relativizing Human Rights 467
holdings (required to compute the Gini Index) are not available for most of the developing
countries, thereby seriously compromising the global perspective of our study (Vanhanen
1997: 50). The alternative measure of land inequality adopted by Prosterman and Riedinger
(1987) would be more in line with our purposes, but again of limited practical utility given
its small coverage.
Democracy
For the level of democracy, we use a modified version of the Polity IV 20-point combined
democracy score (DEMOC – AUTOC), which ranges from −10 to + 10. Following Vree-
land (2008), we use the X-POLITY variable, which includes most of the components of
the combined POLITY score but takes out the components for competitiveness of polit-
ical participation (PARCOMP) and regulation of political participation (PARREG), since
both of these components contain elements of political violence and suppression. Vreeland
argues that their inclusion does not make sense for research on civil war, and we agree
that the same holds true for research on the violation of civil and political rights, since
both components contain features that are also found in measures of human rights. Even
though a large number of human rights studies use the original Polity measure (see Poe
and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Davenport 1999; Zanger 2000a; Davenport and
Armstrong 2004; Bueno de Mesquita, Cherif, Downs, and Smith 2005), we are persuaded
by Vreeland’s argument, and we also expect a positive relationship between his modified
Polity measures and our measure of human rights. Certainly, the work of Bueno de Mesquita
et al. (2005) shows that particular components of the Polity measure are indeed related to
human rights.
Ethnic Fractionalization
The level of ethnolinguistic fractionalization is measured using data from Alesina et al.
(2003). The fractionalization index is computed by using the Herfindahl index of ethno-
linguistic group shares, which represents and improvement over existing measures (e.g.,
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 1999) by compiling a separate variable
for ethnic fragmentation. Their main goal is “to clearly distinguish between ethnic, reli-
gious and linguistic heterogeneity,” where “[a]lternative indicators tend to lump together
ethnic and linguistic differences as part of an ‘ethnolinguistic’ fractionalization variable”
(Alesina et al. 2003: 158). Since their measure is more disaggregated, it has the potential
for better differentiation between the dimensions of fractionalization, even though some
of those dimensions can be overlapping. This variable is included since several studies on
ethnic conflicts have shown that multicultural societies are especially prone to political
instability, domestic violence, and eventually state terror, as authorities are more likely to
resort to coercive means to deal with ethnically based mobilizations and acts of political
dissents (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Walker and Poe 2002). In our preliminary analysis
of this variable, we discovered that its relationship with the protection of human rights is
curvilinear such that up to a point increasing fractionalization is negatively related to the
protection of human rights but then declines as the level of fractionalization increases. In
other words, countries with a small number of distinct lines of ethnic cleavage tend to have
worse protection of human rights, while this with a large plurality of groups tend to have
better protection of human rights. We thus specify our model to include a squared term of
this variable to take into account this particular functional form.
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468 Todd Landman et al.
Domestic Conflict
As in the research on human rights and political violence, we include a variable for internal
domestic conflict, which is specified as an independent variable alongside the other variables
in our model. We do not use the simple dummy variable for civil war from the Correlates of
War project as in much of extant work on human rights, nor do we use events-based measures
of the kind coded from single and multiple news sources found in the literature on political
violence. The civil war dummy is still a fairly crude variable that tends to absorb quite a
lot of the explanatory space in most human rights literature (see Poe and Tate 1994) and
the events-based measures have proved to be fairly insecure for the kind of cross-national
and time-series comparisons conducted here on grounds of validity and reliability. We thus
employ the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) measure of internal conflict, which
is an aggregate 12-point scale that comprises the overall risk levels for civil war and threat
of a military coup, terrorism and political violence, and general levels of civil disorder. We
feel that this measure is superior in some respects since it provides greater variance than the
civil war dummy and perhaps greater validity than the event-based measures of conflict to
date. We expect this variable to have a negative relationship with the protection of human
rights, which is consistent with the findings in both literatures.
Other Control Variables
The level of economic development is measured through the natural log of the value of
real per capita income (GDP, constant 2000 US $) and is taken from the World Bank
Development Indicators. We expect this variable to have a positive relationship with the
protection of human rights. Total population size is based on de facto definition of popula-
tion, which counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship—except for refugees
not permanently settled in the country of asylum, which are generally considered part of
the population of their country of origin. The variable is taken from the World Bank and has
been logged to correct for skewed distribution. We expect this variable to have a negative
relationship with the protection of human rights, since more populous countries tend to
have greater difficulty in protecting personal integrity rights.
Methods of Estimation
Our data set follows by now what has become a standard construction of a matrix of
cross-section and time-series units, where variation in the variables and the number of
observations is maximized across time and space. Such data sets do, however, present a
number of problems for estimating parameters using standard regression techniques. First,
the error terms tend to be correlated from one time period to the other, which is known
(serial correlation). Second, the error terms tend to be heteroskedastic, which means that
they tend to have different variances across units (Stimson 1985; Beck and Katz 1995).
To control for serial correlation, we model the dynamics of our data by introducing a
Prais-Winsten (first order) autoregressive transformation. To control for heteroskedasticity,
we adopt a variation of White’s (1980) estimator of robust standard errors that adjusts for
clustering across countries.
In addition to the standard problems mentioned above, our data set has the additional
problems of unit-specific effects associated with “time invariant” or “nearly time invari-
ant” variables (Plu¨mper and Troeger 2007). In other words, some of our variables do not
vary much or at all over time, and we need a method for controlling for this feature of
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Relativizing Human Rights 469
some of our variables. When unit effects are present, but not explicitly modelled, their
presence is picked up in the error term, and consequently, if these unit effects are then
correlated with one or more explanatory variables, the error term too will be correlated
with the explanatory variables, and simple ordinary least squares (OLS) would produce
biased coefficient estimates. Plu¨mper and Troeger (2007) have devised a three-stage regres-
sion technique known as “fixed-effects-vector-decomposition” (FEVD) that “decomposes”
the explained and unexplained elements of the fixed effects and produces final estimates
that take into account the particular qualities of time invariant or nearly time invariant
variables.
In order to identify the time invariant and nearly time invariant variables in our data
set we compared the “between-unit” variation to the “within-unit” variation (see Table 3),
which is to say, we examined the variation in variables across different countries and within
our countries. We then used the rule of thumb that those variables for which “between vari-
ation” is 2.5 times larger than “within variation” we specify as invariant or nearly invariant.
Those variables for which this is the case include income and land inequality, per capita
GDP, population size, and both forms of the ethnic fractionalization variable. We thus adopt
Table 3
Independent Variables Used in the Statistical Analysis (Summary Statistics With Between
and Within Variation) (Without Imputations)
Variable Mean SD Min Max n
Income Inequality Overall 43.48 7.16 20.07 64.75 3306
Between 7 20.76 58.13
Within 2.09 31.98 61.81
Land Inequality Overall 52.92 20.99 2 100 3229
Between 20.14 4.12 92.44
Within .57 9.62 83.86
Level of Democracy Overall 9.29 4.43 1 14 3412
Between 3.82 1 14
Within 2.23 −2.66 19.21
Ethnic Fragmentation Overall .46 .26 0 .93 3802
Between .26 0 .93
Within 0 .46 .46
Ethnic Fragmentation Sq. Overall .28 .24 0 .87 3802
Between .24 0 .87
Within 0 .28 .28
Domestic Conflict Overall 3.41 2.83 0 12 2630
Between 2.16 0 9.16
Within 1.80 −2.29 10.08
Population Size Overall 15.93 1.54 12.30 20.98 4016
Between 1.54 12.47 20.86
Within .16 13.52 16.68
Economic Development Overall 7.43 1.59 3.80 10.78 3568
Between 1.56 4.57 10.38
Within .22 5.16 8.70
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the fixed-effect vector decomposition method of estimation and specify these variables in
the FEVD procedure as invariant. By doing so, we successfully combine the benefits of
an increased number of observations with the ability to control for unobservable country-
specific differences, eliminating much of the omitted variable bias of cross-sectional data.
FEVD thus represents the most appropriate method of estimation for calculating the resid-
uals in the ways that capture the relative human rights performance that is the main focus
of this article.
The final adjustment made to the data set was to use a popular method to address the
problem of missing data. Some of our variables have less frequent observations than others
and create “patches” in the data set with missing values. We used Gary King’s multiple
imputation method in R to estimate values for which there are no data (Honaker, King, and
Blackwell 2012). The method uses algorithms to impute missing values for all variables.
Since the algorithms randomly draw from the distributions they assume the variables to
follow, the values imputed are a sample, and he thus recommends multiple imputations to
make sure that the results are not driven by the imputed values themselves. He recommends
five imputations, but we used 10, which produces 10 datasets that all have the same values
for the observations without missing data and different imputed values for the missing data.
Since we require a single value for our own procedure, we averaged across the predicted
values from each of the 10 data sets, which we believe provides additional robustness to
our results.
Relativizing Human Rights and a New Country Ranking
The previous sections of the article explained how we derived the human rights factor
score by combining existing measures of human rights and how we calculated the residuals
FIGURE 2. Global time-series trends in expected and actual human rights performance, 1986–2004.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 E
sse
x]
 at
 05
:16
 16
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
14
 
Relativizing Human Rights 471
using the FEVD method of estimation. This section shows the different ways in which the
residuals can be used to compare and contrast human rights performance across and within
regions of the world, and how the picture that emerges is different if only the original scores
had been used. Throughout this section of the article, we present the time-series trends in
the actual values of the factor score alongside the predicted values, which allows for an
assessment of how regions are doing in light of where they ought to be, all things being
equal. Figure 2 shows the global time-series trend in predicted human rights performance
and the global average for the actual values, where the difference between the trends is the
residual. It is clear that for the world, countries had been doing slightly better than expected
up until the end of the Cold War, and then through the late 1990s were doing worse than
expected with a slight improvement to a position of overachievement by the turn of the
twenty-first century.
Figure 3 shows the predicted values alongside the actual values for all regions in the
world. Comparing across the different regional graphs shows that some regions in absolute
terms are doing better than others, where the OECD countries have the highest levels
of performance overall, followed by Eastern Europe, Latin America, Asia, Sub-Saharan
Africa, and the Middle East. But, more importantly for the purposes of this article, the
figure also shows that within regions over time, some regions are doing better than expected
given the other underlying and prevailing factors at work. This relative performance seems
important to us, since it is often absolute levels that are used by academics and policymakers
rather than taking into consideration the underlying factors and then looking at those levels
of performance that remain unexplained. The six regions in Figure 3 are discussed in turn
with reference to specific charts for each.
FIGURE 3. Regional time-series trends in expected and actual human rights performance,
1986–2005.
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FIGURE 4. OECD time-series trends in expected and actual human rights performance, 1986–2004.
The trends in the OECD (Figure 4), as expected, are highest in absolute terms in
comparison to the other regions in the world, but as against their own expected values
(given the relative values of all their independent variables), we can see that the region has
shown a downward trend in performance from the mid-1990s. From 1999 onwards, actual
performance has dropped below expected performance at an increasing rate. This trend
can in part be explained by the new membership of the OECD by “transitional” countries,
including Mexico (1994), Czech Republic (1995), Hungary (1996), Korea (1996), Poland
(1996), and Slovak Republic (2000),7 where human rights performance has not been as
high as in the other OECD member states. For Eastern Europe (Figure 5), progress has been
made over the period both in expected and actual terms, and the actual performance from the
early 1990s exceeds the expected performance in remarkable fashion. The Eastern European
trends are the obverse of the trends in the OECD countries, perhaps since EU membership
and the Copenhagen Criteria provide additional incentives for countries to improve their
human rights performance in ways that membership in the OECD does not. Latin America
(Figure 6) sees very similar trends to those observed in Eastern Europe with an actual level
of performance that becomes consistently positive towards the second half of the period.
Asian performance (Figure 7) has developed from a period of overachievement in the 1980s
to one of underachievement since 1990 even though the region as a whole ranks fourth out
of all the regions. The trends in Sub-Saharan Africa (Figure 8) show similar patterns of
over- and underachievement as in Asia, but from the late 1990s, the actual performance has
caught up to expected performance in ways that are not yet apparent in Asia. Finally, the
Middle East (Figure 9) has the overall lowest levels of performance among the different
regions, and its trends in actual performance have exceeded expected levels in the early part
of the period, fell far below expected performance levels throughout the 1990s and have
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Relativizing Human Rights 473
FIGURE 5. Eastern European time-series trends in expected and actual human rights performance,
1986–2004.
FIGURE 6. Latin American time-series trends in expected and actual human rights performance,
1986–2004.
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FIGURE 7. Asian time-series trends in expected and actual human rights performance, 1986–2004.
shown improvement toward the end of the period where actual performance once again
exceeds expected performance.
As a final illustration of the utility of the relativized score, it is possible to make forecasts
of human rights performance in particular ways. By way of illustration, we wanted to know
the change in performance for those badly performing cases as against an increasing trend
in per capita GDP. We averaged the under/overachievement of each country for the year
2000–2004 and then predicted the change in human rights protection given an underlying
change in per capita GDP (at 2 percent and 5 percent annual growth rates) for two sets of
cases: (1) those cases that fall below the mean, and (2) those that fall 0.5 standard deviation
below the mean. This type of forecast allows us to compare these two different sets of badly
performing countries and show their likely trajectory in terms of human rights performance
using the relative measures that have been developed in this article. Figure 10 shows the
forecasts for both sets of countries at both rates of change in per capita GDP, where it is
clear that positive developments in human rights performance are expected at both rates of
per capita GDP growth, despite the relative underachieving status of the group of cases.
Discussion and Implications
In this article, we have developed a relativized measure of human rights performance that
combined existing measures into a single-factor score, regressed the factor score on a
well-specified set of explanatory variables and saved the residual as a meaningful way to
capture the unexplained variation (or degree of over- and underachievement) in human
rights performance. We showed that there is relatively high consistency and significant
correlation between existing measures and that there is one principal component that
captures an underlying dimension of state protection of civil and political rights that can be
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 E
sse
x]
 at
 05
:16
 16
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
14
 
Relativizing Human Rights 475
FIGURE 8. Sub-Saharan Africa time-series trends in expected and actual human rights performance,
1986–2004.
used to calculate the residual in the ways that we have done here. There is great value in
the relativized scoring system since it allows for a systematic comparison of the expected
and actual levels of performance for the whole world and separate regions over time. The
scores, in turn, allow for the comparison of absolute differences and relative differences that
control for other underlying factors that explain the variation in human rights performance.
Thus, it is possible to show that one region is doing better than another, but in our view, more
importantly, it is possible to show the degrees of progress in a region over time as against
where it ought to be given the presence of other domestic variables. It also eliminates many
of the political arguments about differences in capability and capacity owing to differences,
for example, in levels of development and democracy. Rather, it controls for those and other
factors and then allows for the comparison of human rights performance.
The comparison of actual-to-predicted performance is important for descriptive and
analytical reasons. Descriptively, we have shown in this article that the world appears to
be very different if one takes into account the underlying factors that explain the variation
in human rights performance. Aid policies decided on the basis of absolute scores (e.g., as
the Millennium Challenge Account), in our view, could unfairly punish countries for poor
human rights performance, when in fact, the punished country may be doing better than
expected. For example, if we rank order the countries in our data set from worst performance
to best performance for the year 2004 (a year selected at random) using the actual scores
(see Table 4), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is the worst performer (i.e.,
ranked Number 1), but its predicted score places it as ninth worst, suggesting that the DRC
is doing worse than it ought to be all things being equal (a difference in a rank of eight
places). In contrast, Peru’s actual performance ranks it the sixty-seventh worst country,
while its predicted performance ranks it the twentieth worst country, suggesting that Peru is
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FIGURE 9. Middle East time-series trends in expected and actual human rights performance,
1986–2004.
FIGURE 10. Forecasting human rights performance for underachievers against two rates of change
in per capita GDP, 2010–2020.
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Relativizing Human Rights 477
Table 4
Absolute Rank, Predicted Rank, and Relative Differences in Country Human Rights
Performance (2004)
Country Name
Absolute Rank
(worst to best)
Predicted
Rank (worst to
best)
Relative
Difference in
Rank∗
Congo, DRC 1 9 −8
Sudan 2 3 −1
Colombia 3 4 −1
Burundi 4 16 −12
Nepal 5 30 −25
Korea (North) 6 22 −16
Haiti 7 26 −19
Cote d’Ivoire 8 69 −61
Myanmar (Burma) 9 5 4
China 10 10 0
Iraq 11 1 10
Russian Federation 12 6 6
Ethiopia 13 15 −2
Afghanistan 14 2 12
Israel 15 61 −46
Nigeria 16 32 −16
Bangladesh 17 33 −16
Indonesia 18 18 0
Philippines 19 29 −10
Angola 20 8 12
Somalia 21 14 7
Pakistan 22 17 5
Zimbabwe 23 40 −17
India 24 11 13
Egypt 25 37 −12
Chad 26 19 7
Rwanda 27 24 3
Uzbekistan 28 49 −21
Algeria 29 21 8
Eritrea 30 70 −40
Cameroon 31 39 −8
Turkmenistan 32 58 −26
Syrian Arab Republic 33 13 20
Iran (Islamic Republic of) 34 7 27
Brazil 35 28 7
Yemen, rep. 36 38 −2
Belarus 37 72 −35
Equatorial Guinea 38 48 −10
Lao People’s Democratic
Republic
39 68 −29
(Continued on the next page)
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478 Todd Landman et al.
Table 4
Absolute Rank, Predicted Rank, and Relative Differences in Country Human Rights
Performance (2004) (Continued)
Country Name
Absolute Rank
(worst to best)
Predicted
Rank (worst to
best)
Relative
Difference in
Rank∗
Vietnam 40 60 −20
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 41 35 6
Saudi Arabia 42 43 −1
Venezuela 43 44 −1
Central African Republic 44 59 −15
Thailand 45 87 −42
Togo 46 52 −6
Tunisia 47 56 −9
Lebanon 48 54 −6
Cambodia 49 25 24
Uganda 50 31 19
Sri Lanka 51 12 39
Tanzania 52 66 −14
Turkey 53 23 30
Georgia 54 53 1
Zambia 55 73 −18
Azerbaijan 56 67 −11
Cuba 57 34 23
Mexico 58 42 16
Jamaica 59 102 −43
Honduras 60 82 −22
Ukraine 61 84 −23
Kenya 62 47 15
Mauritania 63 65 −2
Kazakhstan 64 92 −28
Tajikistan 65 46 19
Ecuador 66 75 −9
Peru 67 20 47
Armenia 68 91 −23
Malaysia 69 101 −32
Mozambique 70 41 29
Morocco 71 55 16
Kyrgyzstan 72 100 −28
Republic of Moldova 73 89 −16
Djibouti 74 74 0
Guyana 75 117 −42
Liberia 76 27 49
Malawi 77 83 −6
Guatemala 78 36 42
Dominican Republic 79 107 −28
(Continued on the next page)
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Table 4
Absolute Rank, Predicted Rank, and Relative Differences in Country Human Rights
Performance (2004) (Continued)
Country Name
Absolute Rank
(worst to best)
Predicted
Rank (worst to
best)
Relative
Difference in
Rank∗
Papua New Guinea 80 95 −15
El Salvador 81 63 18
Congo Brazzaville 82 50 32
Jordan 83 93 −10
Guinea 84 62 22
United Arab Emirates 85 123 −38
South Africa 86 71 15
Gambia 87 116 −29
Gabon 88 103 −15
United States of America 89 132 −43
Yugoslavia, fr
(Serbia/Montenegro)
90 45 45
Romania 91 85 6
Trinidad and Tobago 92 136 −44
Albania 93 80 13
Niger 94 106 −12
Bolivia 95 113 −18
Sierra Leone 96 51 45
Swaziland 97 98 −1
Kuwait 98 88 10
Bhutan 99 96 3
Madagascar 100 86 14
Mongolia 101 118 −17
Ghana 102 105 −3
Argentina 103 115 −12
Nicaragua 104 57 47
Paraguay 105 76 29
Guinea-Bissau 106 81 25
Burkina Faso 107 90 17
Lesotho 108 109 −1
Bulgaria 109 94 15
Republic of Korea (South) 110 99 11
The Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia
111 111 0
Namibia 112 77 35
Singapore 113 121 −8
Cyprus 114 145 −31
Mauritius 115 124 −9
Panama 116 112 4
Benin 117 126 −9
(Continued on the next page)
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Table 4
Absolute Rank, Predicted Rank, and Relative Differences in Country Human Rights
Performance (2004) (Continued)
Country Name
Absolute Rank
(worst to best)
Predicted
Rank (worst to
best)
Relative
Difference in
Rank∗
Botswana 118 138 −20
Comoros 119 108 11
Qatar 120 110 10
Oman 121 119 2
Spain 122 135 −13
Greece 123 131 −8
Bosnia Herzegovina 124 64 60
Fiji 125 129 −4
Costa Rica 126 147 −21
Mali 127 114 13
France 128 142 −14
Poland 129 122 7
Hungary 130 141 −11
Czech Republic 131 133 −2
Croatia 132 97 35
Senegal 133 78 55
Bahrain 134 79 55
United Kingdom 135 144 −9
Switzerland 136 151 −15
Portugal 137 148 −11
Germany 138 139 −1
Austria 139 149 −10
Slovakia 140 120 20
Cape Verde 141 125 16
Uruguay 142 140 2
Italy 143 143 0
Taiwan 144 137 7
Japan 145 146 −1
Netherlands 146 156 −10
Luxembourg 147 158 −11
Norway 148 152 −4
Denmark 149 155 −6
Iceland 150 154 −4
Ireland 151 153 −2
Belgium 152 157 −5
Estonia 153 128 25
Australia 154 150 4
Latvia 155 127 28
Chile 156 104 52
Lithuania 157 130 27
(Continued on the next page)
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Table 4
Absolute Rank, Predicted Rank, and Relative Differences in Country Human Rights
Performance (2004) (Continued)
Country Name
Absolute Rank
(worst to best)
Predicted
Rank (worst to
best)
Relative
Difference in
Rank∗
Canada 158 159 −1
Slovenia 159 134 25
New Zealand 160 162 −2
Finland 161 160 1
Sweden 162 161 1
Note. Overperformers are marked in grey; Spearman rank correlation is .86.
∗Relative difference equals the absolute rank minus the predicted rank.
doing much better than expected (a difference in rank of 47 places). Reliance on the actual
scores only could lead to the impression that a country like Peru is not worth supporting
when in fact it is a classic example of a human rights overachiever.
Analytically, the relativized human rights performance should serve as a new variable
in need of explanation. Why is it that some countries are overperformers and some countries
are underperformers? The gap between actual and predicted performance itself is in need
of explanation. The gap can be examined for single countries or groups of countries defined
by region, incomes levels, or other criteria. Possible variables that account for the gap in
performance could include the participation of countries in multiple levels of human rights
governance (e.g., some states are members of regional and international human rights
regimes); the use of trials and other transitional justice mechanisms (e.g., Olsen, Payne,
and Reiter 2010, 2012; Sikkink 2011); the relative position of countries in the global
capitalist system (e.g., Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994; Foweraker and Landman 2004);
social mobilization from domestic and transnational advocacy networks (e.g., Risse, Ropp,
and Sikkink 1999); the presence of “elected authoritarian” regimes as in many Central
Asian countries (e.g., Smith-Cannoy 2012); or other variables of interest that are not part of
the basic human rights model used to derive the relative human performance in this article.
Finally, there is certainly more work to be done in extending this method to other sets
of rights and to using better methods for visualizing relative human rights performance.
For example, we should with very little difficulty be able to replicate our model for certain
sets of economic and social rights, as found, for example, in the Cingranelli and Richards
human rights data project. It is also possible for these scores to be combined with Global
Information Systems (GIS) software to produce human rights performance maps that chart
the degree of over- and underachievement in an easy to understand format for policymakers
and private companies interested in the relative human rights performance of countries. The
forecasting work shown above is of great value to examine the world’s worst performers and
to inform those interested in some form of directed policy intervention aimed at improving
the human rights conditions in particular parts of the world. While our example used growth
in per capita GDP, other variables with links to policy intervention can be used to generate
similar forecasting analyses. We do hope, however, that this article and the method that it
develops will be of enduring value to the community of scholars and practitioners working
in this exciting field.
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Notes
1. For example, the Cingranelli and Richards Human Rights Data Project (CIRI) includes measures
for worker rights and women’s social and economic rights; see www.humanrightsdata.com.
2. Cingranelli and Richards reverse this logic and code good performance with a higher score.
3. See www.politicalterrorscale.org.
4. See www.freedomhouse.org.
5. See www.humanrightsdata.com.
6. This assumption, as it turns out, is often overlooked, where failure to provide a well-specified set of
explanatory variables can result in the residual term capturing a lot of “noise” with it not therefore
representing what it purports to represent. In retrospect, the analysis in Foweraker and Landman
(1997) overlooked this problem with only one explanatory variable, and its use in Cingranelli
and Richards (2007) is also questionable since they have only two explanatory variables in their
model. We hope we overcome this problem in the present article.
7. See www.oecd.org for a list of all member state ratification dates of the Convention on the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.
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